■M\lo 


OTlorli)  |Dcace  jfoun&atum 


THE 

ARBITRATION  TREATIES 

AN  EXAMINATION  OF  THE  MAJORITY  REPORT 
OF  THE  SENATE  COMMITTEE  ON 
FOREIGN  RELATIONS 


ALBERT  E.  PILLSBURY 

Formerly  Attorney-General  of  Massachusetts,  Lecturer  on  Constitutional 
Law  in  the  Law  School  of  Boston  University 


OAK  ST,  HDSF 


WORLD  PEACE  FOUNDATION 

29A  BEACON  STREET,  BOSTON 


WORLD  PEACE  FOUNDATION 

(Formerly  the  International  School  of  Peace) 


PAMPHLET  SERIES 


No.  i. 


No.  2. 


No.  3. 


April,  ign 

Part  I.  THE  RESULTS  OF  THE  TWO  HAGUE  CONFER¬ 
ENCES  AND  THE  DEMANDS  UPON  THE  THIRD 
CONFERENCE.  By  Edwin  D.  Mead 
Part  n.  SIR  EDWARD  GREY  ON  UNION  FOR  WORLD  PEACE 
Speech  in  House  of  Commons,  March  13,  1911 
Part  III.  THE  WORLD  PEACE  FOUNDATION.  By  Edwin  Ginn 
Part  IV.  THE  INTERNATIONAL  DUTY  OF  THE  UNITED 
STATES  AND  GREAT  BRITAIN.  By  Edwin  D.  Mead 

July,  1911 

Part  I.  LIST  OF  ARBITRATION  TREATIES 

Compiled  by  Denys  P.  Myers 
Part  II.  SOME  SUPPOSED  JUST  CAUSES  OF  WAR 
By  Hon.  Jackson  H.  Ralston 
Part  III.  SYNDICATES  FOR  WAR 

London  Correspondence  of  the  New  York  Evening  Post 

October,  1911 

Part  I.  WHY  THE  ARBITRATION  TREATIES  SHOULD 
STAND.  Prepared  by  Denys  P.  Myers 
Part  II.  WAR  NOT  INEVITABLE.  By  Hon.  John  W.  Foster 
Part  III.  PARLIAMENTARY  GOVERNMENT  AND  THE 
INTERPARLIAMENTARY  UNION 

By  Dr.  Christian  L.  Lange 

Part  IV.  CHAMBERS  OF  COMMERCE  FOR  ARBITRATION 


Without  Serial  Number 

THE  MISSION  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  IN  THE  CAUSE  OF  PEACE 
By  Hon.  David  J.  Brewer 

THE  LITERATURE  OF  THE  PEACE  MOVEMENT.  By  Edwin  D.  Mead 
HEROES  OF  PEACE.  By  Edwin  D.  Mead 

EDUCATIONAL  ORGANIZATIONS  PROMOTING  INTERNATIONAL 
FRIENDSHIP.  By  Lucia  Ames  Mead 
THE  WASTE  OF  MILITARISM 

From  the  Report  of  the  Massachusetts  Commission  on  the  Cost  of  Living 
THE  GRANGE  AND  PEACE.  Report  adopted  by  the  National  Grange,  1909 
For  free  distribution.  Price  in  quantities,  $3.00  per  hundred  copies 


WORLD  PEACE  FOUNDATION 

29  A  Beacon  Street  ------  Boston,  Mass. 


TfliV 


Pt^a. 


THE  ARBITRATION  TREATIES 


?  An  Examination  of  the  Majority  Report  of  the  Senate  Committee  on  Foreign 
Relations,  in  an  Address  before  the  World  Peace  Foundation, 
Massachusetts  Peace  Society  and  Twentieth  Century 
Club,  at  Boston,  December  14,  iqii 


by 

ALBERT  E.  PILLSBURY 


Formerly  Attorney-General  of  Massachusetts,  Lecturer  on  Constitutional  Law 
in  the  Law  School  of  Boston  U niversity 


The  dream  of  philanthropists,  to  get  rid  of  war,  has  almost  in  a 
day  become  the  problem  of  statesmen.  What  has  worked  this  mir¬ 
acle?  Not  that  war  is  unnecessary,  foolish,  wasteful,  brutalizing, 
and  wicked,  not  that  “war  is  hell,”  but  it  is  becoming  too  expen¬ 
sive.  Modern  improvements  in  the  art  of  butchery  and  destruc¬ 
tion  have  made  it  so  costly  that  more  than  one  national  exchequer 
is  breaking  down  under  the  mere  attempt  to  maintain  a  state  of  prep¬ 
aration  for  it.  Statesmen  have  to  take  notice  of  this,  and  even 
pseudo-statesmen  more  or  less  reluctantly  admit  that  something  must 
be  done  about  it. 

This  motive,  with  the  advancing  moral  sentiment  of  the  world,  has 
given  the  cause  of  international  arbitration  an  impetus  which  the 
roost  confident  opponent  of  war  would  not  have  predicted  at  the  begin¬ 
ning  of  the  twentieth  century.  The  pending  treaties  of  the  United 
States  with  Great  Britain  and  France  are  so  far  in  advance  of  any 
previous  achievement  that  their  importance,  not  only  to  our  own 
country  and  to  the  other  powers  concerned  but  to  the  cause  of 
civilization  throughout  the  world,  can  hardly  be  overestimated.  If 
ratified,  they  will  mark  an  epoch  in  the  history  of  international  rela¬ 
tions,  and  indeed  in  the  history  of  mankind,  as  a  beginning  of  the 
practical  abolition  of  war. 

The  Hague  Convention  of  1907  does  not  bind  any  nation  by  direct 
agreement  to  arbitrate  any  controversy.  In  our  treaties  of  1908  with 
Great  Britain  and  France  we  agreed  to  arbitrate  all  differences  of  a 
legal  nature  or  relating  to  the  interpretation  of  treaties,  but  with  the 
large  exception  of  such  as  affect  “the  vital  interests,  the  independence 


4 


i 

or  the  honor/’  of  the  parties,  or  the  interests  of  others.  This  left 
undone  the  vital  thing,  which  is  to  bring  this  most  difficult  and  dis¬ 
turbing  class  of  questions  into  agreed  arbitration  and  put  them 
beyond  the  hazard  of  war. 

Early  in  the  present  year  President  Taft,  with  a  courage  and  eleva¬ 
tion  of  purpose  that  will  remain  his  highest  title  to  distinction,  made 
overtures  to  Great  Britain  and  France  respectively  toward  a  treaty 
of  arbitration  as  nearly  universal  as  the  present  state  of  public  senti¬ 
ment  and  human  development  is  supposed  to  permit.  The  response 
was  immediate  and  cordial.  The  position  taken  by  the  President, 
and  the  remarkable  speech  of  the  British  Foreign  Secretary  in  the 
House  of  Commons,  attracted  and  fixed  the  attention  of  the  world 
upon  this  undertaking  of  three  of  the  greatest  nations  to  make  a  real 
beginning  at  the  abolition  of  war,  and  all  civilized  mankind  has  been 
watching  the  mighty  experiment  with  eager  interest  and  the  most 
anxious  hope  for  its  success.  All  the  auspices  appeared  favorable. 
In  August  the  treaties  were  signed  and  laid  before  the  Senate  for  its 
consent,  when  the  first  discordant  note  was  sounded  by  a  majority  of 
the  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations,  recommending  that  the  vital 
clause  be  stricken  from  the  treaties. 

To  understand  the  real  issue  presented  by  this  action  of  the  com¬ 
mittee,  it  is  necessary  to  know  what  the  treaties  undertake  to  do. 
The  two  are  in  substantially  the  same  terms,  and  may  be  considered 
together.  The  clause  of  Article  I  defining  the  scope  of  each  treaty 
is  as  follows: — 

“All  differences  hereafter  arising  between  the  High  Contracting 
Parties,  which  it  has  not  been  possible  to  adjust  by  diplomacy,  relat¬ 
ing  to  international  matters  in  which  the  High  Contracting  Parties 
are  concerned  by  virtue  of  a  claim  of  right  made  by  one  against  the 
other  under  treaty  or  otherwise,  and  wffiich  are  justiciable  in  their 
nature  by  reason  of  being  susceptible  of  decision  by  the  application 
of  the  principles  of  law  or  equity,  shall  be  submitted  to  the  Perma¬ 
nent  Court  of  Arbitration  established  at  The  Hague  by  the  Conven¬ 
tion  of  October  18, 1907,  or  to  some  other  arbitral  tribunal,  as  may  be 
decided  in  each  case  by  special  agreement.” 

The  great  advance  beyond  the  treaties  of  1908  is  in  bringing  ques¬ 
tions  of  the  “national  honor”  class  within  the  scope  of  agreed  arbitra¬ 
tion.  The  substance  of  the  agreement  is  that  all  differences,  of  what¬ 
ever  character,  arising  by  virtue  of  a  claim  of  right,  if  justiciable  in 
their  nature,  shall  be  arbitrated.  Another  new  and  important 
provision,  adopted  from  the  Hague  Convention,  is  that  upon  request 


5 


of  either  party  any  controversy  may  be  sent  to  a  Joint  Commission 
of  Inquiry  for  investigation  and  recommendation,  with  an  interval  of 
a  year’s  time,  if  desired;  thus  securing  deliberation,  a  judicial  find¬ 
ing  of  the  facts,  and  the  advice  of  a  tribunal  of  high  character,  as  a 
safeguard  against  public  clamor  and  the  danger  of  sudden  war  in  hot 
blood. 

The  vital  working  feature  remains,  the  feature  that  makes  each 
treaty  a  real  and  effective  compact  of  peace.  Recognizing  that 
the  question  of  what  is  a  justiciable  or  arbitrable  case  may  be  sub¬ 
ject  to  difference  of  opinion,  and  that  the  treaty  may  go  for  naught 
and  its  benefits  be  lost  if  arbitration  can  be  defeated  because  of  such 
difference,  it  is  further  provided  that,  if  the  parties  disagree  as  to 
whether  a  particular  case  is  within  the  scope  of  the  treaty  as  a 
proper  subject  of  arbitration,  this  question  shall  be  submitted  to  the 
Joint  Commission  of  Inquiry,  and,  if  that  body  finds  that  the  case  is 
within  the  treaty  description,  it  shall  go  to  arbitration.  This  is  the 
final  clause  of  Article  III,  which  is  in  these  terms: — 

“It  is  further  agreed,  however,  that  in  cases  in  which  the  Parties 
disagree  as  to  whether  or  not  a  difference  is  subject  to  arbitration 
under  Article  I  of  this  Treaty,  that  question  shall  be  submitted  to 
the  Joint  High  Commission  of  Inquiry;  and  if  all  or  all  but  one  of  the 
members  of  the  Commission  agree  and  report  that  such  difference  is 
within  the  scope  of  Article  I,  it  shall  be  referred  to  arbitration  in 
accordance  with  the  provisions  of  this  Treaty.” 

This  is  the  crucial  point.  It  is  this  feature  that  makes  the  treaties 
significant  beyond  any  others  ever  concluded  between  nations,  for 
this,  and  this  alone,  ensures  the  arbitration  of  every  justiciable 
case.  This  clause  is  stricken  out  by  the  majority  of  the  committee 
in  reporting  the  treaties  to  the  Senate.  The  report  encountered  at 
the  threshold  the  formidable  dissent  of  Senators  Root  and  Burton 
with  the  Chairman,  who  favor  the  treaties  as  they  are,  and  with 
whom  Senators  McCumber  and  Sutherland  are  now  aligned,  but 
it  prevented  immediate  ratification  and  will  destroy,  if  it  prevails, 
the  moral  effect  and  the  practical  value  of  the  movement  of  which 
these  treaties  are  the  culmination.  It  has  gone  out  to  the  world 
that  the  treaties  are  held  up  in  the  American  Senate,  and  this  is 
liable  to  be  taken  abroad  as  representing  the  sentiment  of  the  coun¬ 
try.  The  President  appeals  from  the  committee  to  the  people,  and 
it  becomes  their  duty  to  acquaint  themselves  with  the  reasons  by 
which  it  is  sought  to  justify  this  action  of  the  majority,  that  they 


6 


may  bring  to  bear  upon  the  situation  the  controlling  force  of  an  en¬ 
lightened  public  opinion. 

It  is  apparent  on  the  face  of  the  report — indeed,  the  majority  make 
no  attempt  to  conceal  it — that  their  objection  to  the  treaties  is  wholly 
because  of  the  supposed  invasion  of  the  prerogatives  of  the  Senate. 
But  they  appear  to  fall  into  the  singular  error  of  taking  the  final 
clause  of  Article  III,  which  they  would  strike  out,  as  meaning  that, 
if  the  Joint  Commission  of  Inquiry  finds  a  case  to  be  within  the 
treaty,  it  must  then  go  to  arbitration,  without  any  power  remain¬ 
ing  in  the  Senate  to  interfere  or  prevent  it. 

It  might  not  be  an  unmixed  misfortune  if  it  were  so,  but  such 
is  not  the  treaty.  Senator  Burton  makes  this  clear  in  his  dissenting 
statement,  and,  if  anything  can  be  wanting  to  his  demonstration, 
Secretary  Knox,  in  his  address  at  Cincinnati,  has  supplied  it.  If 
the  Commission  finds  a  case  to  be  within  the  treaty,  then,  by  the 
express  terms  of  this  clause,  “it  shall  be  referred  to  arbitration  in 
accordance  with  the  provisions  of  this  Treaty”  By  the  provisions 
of  the  treaty,  in  Article  I,  no  case  goes  to  arbitration  until  the  de¬ 
tails  are  first  settled  by  a  special  agreement,  to  be  made  on  our  part 
by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate.  According  to 
the  plain  language,  and  for  all  the  reasons  of  the  case,  this  provision 
operates  as  fully  when  the  Commission  has  found  a  difference  to  be 
arbitrable  as  it  does  when  the  parties  have  agreed  at  the  outset  that 
it  is  arbitrable.  In  either  event  the  same  procedure  follows,  of 
which  the  special  agreement  is  a  part.  As  this  is  subject  to  the 
consent  of  the  Senate,  that  body  has  the  same  power  over  the  arbi¬ 
tration  in  the  one  case  as  in  the  other. 

It  may  be  possible  that  the  attack  of  the  majority  upon  Article 
III  was  wholly  due  to  this  mistaken  conception  of  its  effect  upon 
the  senatorial  prerogatives.  But  when  their  position  is  examined 
sufficiently  to  see  what  they  are  really  contending  for,  this  will  ap¬ 
pear  unlikely,  for  a  reason  which  must  be  noticed. 

While  the  power  of  the  Senate  to  interfere  and  stop  an  arbitra¬ 
tion  after  the  Joint  Commission  has  found  the  case  to  be  arbitrable 
is  as  clear  and  unquestionable  as  its  power  to  prevent  the  arbitra¬ 
tion  of  any  other  case  by  declaring  it  not  properly  arbitrable,  the 
actual  situation  of  the  Senate  in  the  respective  cases  is  quite  dif¬ 
ferent.  When  the  Commission  has  found  a  case  to  be  within  the 
treaty,  arbitration  would  follow  as  of  course,  subject  only  to  the 
power  of  the  Senate  to  block  it  by  refusing  its  consent  to  the  spe- 


7 


dal  agreement.  Under  ordinary  tircumstances  the  Senate  would 
not  be  justified  to  the  country,  and  much  less  to  the  adverse  party, 
in  thus  defeating  an  arbitration  at  this  stage,  as  this  would  properly 
be  regarded  as  a  breach  of  the  faith  of  the  treaty.  But  if  any  mis¬ 
carriage  of  the  Executive,  or  of  a  Commission,  should  ever  imperil 
the  national  interests, — a  case  wholly  unlikely  to  occur, —  this  power 
could  be  exercised,  and  it  would  be  ample  for  the  emergency.  The 
Senate  could  stop  the  proceedings,  and,  if  done  to  avert  a  real  national 
peril,  undoubtedly  the  country  would  sustain  the  act. 

On  the  other  hand,  if  the  final  clause  of  Article  III  is  stricken 
from  the  treaties  as  the  majority  recommend,  the  Senate  retains  not 
only  the  power  but  the  unqualified  right  to  prevent  arbitration,  in 
any  case  and  so  in  all  cases,  if  it  chooses  to  say  that  the  case  is  not 
properly  arbitrable.  It  is  plain,  therefore,  that  the  majority  stand 
not  merely  for  an  emergency  power  to  prevent  an  arbitration,  which 
the  Senate  will  retain  in  any  event,  but  a  power  which  they  can  exer¬ 
cise  freely  and  at  their  pleasure,  without  being  open  to  the  charge 
of  bad  faith.  In  short,  they  stand  not  merely  for  the  power,  but  for 
the  moral  and  political  right,  to  prevent  arbitration  in  any  case  if  they 
see  fit,  keeping  the  whole  subject  at  all  times  within  their  own  control. 

This  would  continue  in  perpetuity  the  very  state  of  things  that 
arbitration  is  designed  to  put  an  end  to,  and  is  principally  valuable 
for  putting  an  end  to.  The  highest  service  of  arbitration  is  to  place 
a  cause  of  international  offence  where  statesmen  cannot  play  politics 
with  it,  nor  an  excited  populace  foment  it  into  sudden  war.  The 
issue  thus  presented  by  the  majority  report  should  be  so  clearly  under¬ 
stood  that  there  can  be  no  mistake  about  it.  The  most  hardened 
advocate  of  war  must  be  satisfied  with  the  report,  and  might  have 
written  it.  If  the  treaties  are  so  amended,  they  are  destroyed  for 
the  purposes  of  any  case  in  which  a  third  of  the  Senate  is,  for  any 
reason,  disinclined  to  arbitration.  If  the  Senate  follows  the  lead 
of  the  committee,  it  is  notice  to  the  world  that  an  effective  treaty  of 
general  arbitration  with  the  United  States  is  impossible. 

The  majority  could  not  openly  concede  that  they  are  dealing  the 
treaties  a  fatal  blow  for  no  better  reason  than  solicitude  for  their 
own  privileges.  They  must  find  some  other  reason.  Accordingly, 
they  do  not  stop  with  the  mere  objection  that  the  treaties  deprive  the 
Senate  of  its  control  over  arbitration.  They  plant  themselves  upon 
the  Constitution,  and  say  that  the  reference  to  a  Commission  of  the 
question  whether  a  difference  is  within  the  scope  of  the  treaty  amounts 


8 


to  an  unconstitutional  delegation  of  the  treaty-making  power  of  the 
Senate. 

This  is  important,  if  true.  But  the  question  to  be  referred  relates 
to  interpretation  of  the  treaty.  In  the  treaties  of  1908  we  agreed 
to  arbitrate  all  questions  “  relating  to  the  interpretation  of  treaties/’ 
except  such  as  fall  into  the  national  honor  class,  and  nothing  was 
heard  about  the  Constitution. 

Probably  we  should  all  agree,  however,  that  if  the  treaties  in¬ 
volve  the  surrender  of  any  constitutional  power  of  the  Senate  or 
its  delegation  to  an  international  commission  in  violation  of  the 
Constitution,  they  ought  not  to  be  ratified  in  that  form.  The  most 
eminent  constitutional  authority  in  the  committee,  and  some  of 
the  most  eminent  in  the  country,  have  expressed  opinions  against 
this  view  of  the  majority.  It  will  not  be  difficult  to  show,  if  there 
is  any  need  of  showing,  that  these  opinions  are  correct  and  the 
ground  taken  by  the  majority  untenable. 

What  is  the  treaty-making  power  of  the  Senate?  It  is  con¬ 
ferred,  in  a  dozen  words,  by  Section  2  of  Article  II  of  the  Con¬ 
stitution.  The  President  “shall  have  power,  by  and  with  the 
advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate,  to  make  treaties,  provided  two- 
thirds  of  the  senators  present  concur.”  The  advisory  function  is 
only  incidental  to  the  consenting  power,  which  is  the  real  power 
conferred. 

We  might  stop  with  this  statement,  for  the  fallacy  of  the  majority 
report  is  apparent  on  the  face  of  it.  Does  the  treaty  vest  in  the 
Commission  or  divest  from  the  Senate  any  part  of  the  power  of 
the  Senate  to  consent  or  refuse  its  consent  to  a  treaty?  Clearly  it 
does  not. 

There  is  another  short  answer  to  the  constitutional  objection. 
Probably  no  one  would  suppose  it  to  be  an  unconstitutional  dele¬ 
gation  of  the  power  of  the  Senate  to  submit  a  particular  case  to  ar¬ 
bitration  on  the  express  condition  that  the  arbitral  tribunal  finds  it 
to  be  a  justiciable  claim  of  right,  capable  of  decision  by  principles 
of  law  or  equity.  These  or  essentially  similar  conditions  must  nec¬ 
essarily  be  implied,  if  not  expressed,  in  many  treaties  of  arbitration. 
The  principle  involved  in  the  pending  treaties  is  precisely  the  same. 
If  the  one  instance  is  not  unconstitutional,  the  other  cannot  be. 

But  let  us  examine  the  supposed  constitutional  question  a  fit  tie 
more  closely.  The  consenting  power  of  the  Senate  necessarily  carries 


9 


with  it  the  right  or  privilege  of  passing  upon  every  question,  of  fact 
or  law,  involved  in  any  case.  The  Senate  could  have  rejected, 
from  the  beginning,  every  treaty  of  arbitration,  and  insisted  that 
no  difference  with  any  foreign  power  should  be  adjusted  save  by 
a  direct  agreement  of  settlement,  after  every  question  involved  had 
been  examined  and  determined  by  the  Senate  itself.  Of  course,  the 
Senate  has  never  taken  this  position.  On  the  contrary,  it  has  almost 
from  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution  been  accustomed  to  consent 
to  treaties  of  arbitration,  and  has  throughout  that  long  period  con¬ 
sented  to  a  large  number  of  them. 

How  do  the  pending  treaties  differ  from  other  treaties  of  arbitra¬ 
tion  to  which  the  Senate  has  consented?  So  far  as  this  question  is 
concerned,  they  differ  only  by  the  single  provision  that,  if  the  powers 
do  not  agree  as  to  whether  a  particular  difference  is  within  the  treaty 
description  of  arbitrable  cases,  this  question  may  be  referred  to  and 
decided  by  an  international  Commission. 

This  is  a  mixed  question  of  fact  and  law,  involving,  first,  a  knowl¬ 
edge  of  the  facts  of  the  case,  second,  such  construction  of  the  treaty, 
if  any,  as  may  be  necessary  to  determine  whether  the  case  is  within 
it.  But  in  every  arbitration  the  tribunal  is  empowered  to  find  the 
facts,  so  far  as  they  are  in  dispute,  and  it  necessarily  has  power  to 
construe  the  treaty  or  agreement,  not  only  to  determine  whether  the 
case  presented  is  within  it,  but  for  all  other  purposes  essential  to  the 
decision.  Otherwise,  it  could  make  no  decision. 

The  only  real  difference,  then,  between  these  treaties  and  previous 
treaties  of  arbitration  is  that  this  particular  question,  whether  a  case 
is  within  the  scope  of  a  treaty,  may  not  heretofore  have  been  sub¬ 
mitted  to  arbitration  by  itself.  Is  there  anything  in  the  Constitution 
which  forbids  this  to  be  done,  or  makes  it  a  delegation  of  the  treaty¬ 
making  power  of  the  Senate? 

There  are  no  express  limitations  on  the  treaty-making  power. 
Clearly  there  can  be  no  implied  limitation  which  would  exclude 
treaties  of  arbitration.  A  sovereign  nation  has  inherent  power  to 
make  any  sort  of  treaty,  and  the  whole  treaty-making  power  of  the 
United  States  is  vested  in  the  President  with  the  consent  of  the  Senate. 
Nor  was  it  ever  supposed  that  there  is  any  implied  limitation 
upon  the  number  or  character  of  questions  that  may  be  submitted 
to  arbitration,  or  the  time  or  order  or  manner  of  submission.  The 
power  has  always  been  taken  to  include,  and  does  without  doubt 
include,  every  phase  and  particular  of  the  adjustment  of  every  in- 


I 


IO 


ternationai  dispute,  each  and  every  one  of  which  may  be  dealt  with 
in  any  manner  to  which  the  treaty  powers  agree.  All  this  has  been 
assumed  without  question,  and  is  now  historically  settled. 

The  power  of  the  Senate  to  decide  for  itself  the  question  whether 
a  particular  case  is  a  proper  subject  of  arbitration  is  only  a  part  of  the 
same  power  that  authorizes  it  to  decide  for  itself  any  or  every  other 
question,  of  fact  or  of  law,  involved  in  any  case,  before  consenting  to 
a  treaty.  If  it  is  an  unconstitutional  delegation  of  its  power  to  leave 
this  question  to  a  Commission,  it  is  equally  so  to  leave  any  other  dis¬ 
puted  question  to  a  Commission.  If  the  Constitution  requires  that 
this  question  be  determined  by  the  Senate,  it  requires  equally  that 
every  other  disputed  question  be  determined  by  the  Senate,  and  all 
arbitration  is,  and  has  always  been,  a  delegation  of  the  power  of  the 
Senate  and  unconstitutional. 

Nobody  would  believe  this,  nor  is  there  any  reason  for  believing  it. 
While  the  Constitution  empowers  the  Senate  to  determine  every  ques¬ 
tion  for  itself  if  it  sees  fit,  nobody  has  ever  supposed  that  the  Con¬ 
stitution  requires  the  Senate  to  determine  every  question,  or  any 
particular  question,  or  any  particular  class  of  questions.  The  ref¬ 
erence  of  this  question  is  as  plainly  an  exercise  of  the  treaty-making 
power,  and  as  constitutional  an  exercise  of  it,  as  the  reference  of  any 
other  question  to  arbitration  or  negotiation. 

To  delegate  its  constitutional  power  of  consenting  or  refusing  its 
consent  to  a  treaty,  which  the  Senate  cannot  do  if  it  would,  is  one 
thing.  To  waive  the  exercise  of  a  right  or  privilege  possessed  by 
virtue  of  the  treaty-making  power,  which  it  can  do  and  does  in  every 
treaty  of  arbitration,  is  quite  a  different  thing.  The  government 
properly  waives  its  right  to  make  war  whenever  it  concludes  a  treaty 
of  peace,  but  it  does  not  and  cannot  surrender  or  delegate  its  power 
to  make  war.  The  majority  of  the  committee  appear  to  overlook  this 
distinction. 

There  is  hardly  need  of  resort  to  judicial  authority  upon  so  plain 
a  question,  but  this  is  nothing  new  or  unfamiliar.  It  was  long  ago 
judicially  settled  that  it  is  not  a  delegation  of  legislative  power  for 
a  law  to  leave  to  a  public  board  or  officer  a  question  upon  which  its 
application  or  operation  may  depend.  For  a  cogent  example,  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  has  held  that  it  is  not  uncon¬ 
stitutional  as  an  exercise  of  legislative  or  treaty-making  powers  for 
the  President  to  decide,  as  under  treaties  or  Acts  of  Congress  he 
may,  whether  a  foreign  country  is  within  the  scope  of  a  tariff  act 


II 


or  reciprocity  treaty.  Similar  illustrations  might  be  multiplied 
without  limit.  The  question  left  by  the  pending  treaties  to  the 
Joint  Commission,  whether  a  particular  case  is  within  the  scope  of 
the  treaty,  is  precisely  such  a  question. 

The  conclusion  is  unavoidable  that  the  treaties  involve  no  dele¬ 
gation  of  the  power  of  the  Senate  and  no  infringement  of  the  Constitu¬ 
tion.  And  we  have  already  seen  that  they  do  not  deprive  the  Senate 
of  its  power  over  any  arbitration,  unconstitutionally  or  otherwise. 
As  each  ground  fails  upon  which  the  majority  profess  to  stand  (for 
they  protest  much  against  official  pride  of  position  or  privilege  as 
any  part  of  their  motive  to  opposition),  it  ought  to  be  enough  to  stop 
here. 

But  they  nevertheless  say,  and  urge  the  objection  at  great  length, 
that,  even  if  not  unconstitutional,  it  would  be  “most  unwise  and 
most  perilous”  to  so  far  deprive  the  Senate  of  its  power,  as  they 
call  it,  as  to  allow  the  question  whether  a  difference  is  within  the 
scope  of  the  treaty  to  be  referred  to  and  decided  by  a  Commission. 
We  have  seen  that  the  Senate  is  not  deprived  of  any  part  of  its  power, 
but,  if  the  treaties  are  for  any  reason  unwise  or  perilous,  this  ought 
to  be  known. 

The  majority  assign  some  reasons  why  this  reference  would  in 
their  view  be  unwise  and  perilous.  They  say  that  the  description 
of  the  questions  embraced  by  the  treaties  is  novel,  and  is  very  large, 
general,  and  indeterminate;  that  nobody  knows  exactly  what  “jus¬ 
ticiable”  means,  or  what  “equity”  is,  and  “under  these  circumstances 
to  vest  in  an  outside  Commission  the  power  to  say  finally  what  the 
treaty  means  by  its  very  general  and  indefinite  language  is  to  vest 
in  that  Commission  the  power  to  make  for  us  an  entirely  different 
treaty  from  that  which  we  supposed  ourselves  to  be  making.”  This, 
again,  is  important  if  true,  and  as  it  is  calculated  to  excite  opposition 
to  the  treaties,  it  calls  for  examination. 

The  President  and  Secretary  of  State  have  answered  for  themselves, 
politely  but  effectually,  the  intimation  that  they  did  not  know  what 
they  were  about,  and  acted  so  unwisely  as  to  put  the  national  interests 
in  peril,  in  negotiating  the  treaties.  It  is  indeed  novel,  as  the  report 
says,  to  bring  questions  of  the  national  honor  class  within  the  scope 
of  agreed  arbitration.  It  is  the  greatest  advance  ever  made  at  one 
step  in  the  history  of  international  relations,  and  it  has  taken  more 
than  a  hundred  years  of  arbitration  to  bring  the  system  to  this  point 
of  development.  But,  so  far  from  an  objection  to  the  treaties,  this 


12 


is  generally  and  justly  regarded  as  their  highest  claim  to  the  favor  of 
the  parties  and  of  the  world. 

The  treaties  do  not  appear  to  be  especially  difficult  or  doubtful 
of  meaning.  As  treaties  go,  they  are  short  and  clear.  They  can 
be  made  to  appear  doubtful,  as  any  written  instrument  can  be,  or 
they  can  be  read  plainly.  It  is  inaccurate  and  misleading  to  say 
that  Article  III  leaves  to  the  Commission  “the  power  to  say 
finally  what  the  treaty  means,”  or  “the  power  to  make  for  us  an 
entirely  different  treaty.”  It  leaves  to  the  Commission  the  power  to 
find,  upon  judicial  inquiry,  whether  a  particular  case  is  within  the 
treaty  description  of  arbitrable  cases,  and  nothing  more.  The  word 
“justiciable”  which  troubles  the  majority,  so  far  from  being  left 
doubtful  is  defined,  in  plain  words.  A  case  is  justiciable  if  it  can  be 
decided  by  the  principles  of  law  or  equity.  The  “law”  in  question 
is  a  reasonably  well-established  science,  not  unfamiliar  to  those 
having  to  deal  with  it.  “Equity”  is  a  broader  term,  but  it  would 
not  seem  to  be  embarrassing.  The  majority  take  it,  and  are 
probably  justified  in  taking  it,  to  mean  “that  which  is  equally  right 
or  just  to  all  concerned;  as  the  application  of  the  dictates  of  good 
conscience  to  the  settlement  of  controversies.”  Do  they  regard 
equity,  thus  defined,  as  objectionable?  It  may  appear  to  some 
minds  unfortunate  that  such  principles  as  these  should  be  applied 
to  the  settlement  of  international  disputes,  but  this  is  commonly 
understood  to  be  the  very  purpose  of  arbitration. 

It  is  to  be  remembered  that,  whenever  the  powers  are  not  agreed 
that  a  case  is  arbitrable,  either  party  may  bring  it  before  the  Com¬ 
mission  for  previous  examination, — “for  impartial  and  conscientious 
investigation”  are  the  words, — so  that  the  question  of  arbitrability 
may  always  be  decided  upon  full  knowledge  of  the  case,  in  the  light 
of  all  facts  and  arguments  that  can  be  brought  to  bear  upon  it.  Have 
we  anything  to  fear  from  this?  Is  there  any  reason  why  the  United 
States  cannot  afford  to  come  into  this  agreement  if  Great  Britain 
and  France  or  other  foreign  powers  can  afford  to  come  into  it? 

By  way  of  answer  to  this  question  the  majority  refer  to  territory, 
immigration,  and  the  Monroe  Doctrine  as  subjects  which  ought 
never  to  be  submitted  to  arbitration, — subjects,  indeed,  which  “no 
nation  could  submit  to  an  outside  judgment  without  abdicating  its 
sovereignty  and  independence,”  but  which,  they  say,  are  liable  to  be 
forced  upon  us  under  these  treaties,  if  ratified.  Perhaps  we  ought  to 
assume  that  the  majority  present  this  argument  in  good  faith.  Other¬ 
wise,  it  would  appear  to  be  dragged  in  for  the  purpose  of  diverting 


13 


attention  from  the  real  issue  to  one  which  may  excite  public  appre¬ 
hension  and  help  to  defeat  the  treaties.  It  really  need  not  be  dis¬ 
cussed,  for,  as  Senator  Root  points  out,  all  such  apprehensions  can  be 
foreclosed  by  a  stroke  of  the  pen  in  the  act  of  ratification,  without 
touching  the  text  of  the  treaty.  Even  this  ought  not  to  be  done. 
The  treaties  are  plain  enough  without  it.  It  may  have  to  be  done, 
as  a  concession  to  prejudice  or  misunderstanding,  and,  if  done,  it  dis¬ 
poses  of  this  argument. 

But  passing  this,  and  passing  the  questionable  expediency  of  cast¬ 
ing  out  in  advance  of  the  treaties  the  unnecessary  invitation  to  do 
what  probably  no  foreign  power  would  ever  think  of  doing  but  for 
the  notice  that  it  may  be  expected,  what  is  to  be  apprehended 
in  this  direction?  The  treaties  do  not  extend  to  matters  wholly  of 
governmental  policy.  This  would  seem  to  be  plain  enough  on  the 
face  of  them.  Secretary  Knox,  at  Cincinnati,  has  added  his  demon¬ 
stration  to  that  of  the  dissenting  senators,  explaining  that  the  treaties 
were  drawn  with  special  care  to  exclude  such  questions,  in  defer¬ 
ence  to  the  supposed  unwillingness  of  the  Senate  to  allow  them  to  be 
brought  within  the  scope  of  arbitration.  We  have  seen  that  an 
arbitrable  case  must  be  one  in  which  each  party  has  a  legitimate  con¬ 
cern,  that  it  must  stand  upon  a  claim  of  right  based  upon  a  treaty  or 
some  other  recognized  international  obligation,  and  must  be  capable 
of  decision  by  principles  of  law  or  equity.  This  description  cannot 
be  applied  to  immigration,  or  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  As  to  this, 
the  case  is  so  clear  that  the  British  Foreign  Secretary  has  publicly 
avowed  his  opinion  that  the  treaty  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  Monroe 
Doctrine. 

Take  immigration.  It  lies  at  the  foundation  of  international  law 
that  no  nation  has  or  can  claim  a  right  to  introduce  its  inhabitants 
into  another  country  against  the  will  of  the  latter,  and  no  nation  is 
bound  to  receive  them.  This  is  a  policy  which  every  nation  may 
determine  for  itself,  unquestioned  by  any  other.  These  treaties  can 
have  no  concern  with  it,  unless  such  a  question  should  arise  under 
some  other  treaty  provision,  in  which  event  probably  every  one  would 
agree  that  it  is  a  proper  subject  of  arbitration. 

Take  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  A  good  deal  might  be  said,  if  the 
occasion  required,  about  this  ancient  fetich,  but  it  is  unnecessary. 
This,  too,  has  nothing  to  do  with  claims  of  right  and  is  not  adjudi- 
cable  by  principles  of  law  or  equity.  If  anything,  it  is  a  political 
policy  of  our  government,  resting  solely  in  our  own  will  and  our  power 


14 


to  enforce  it.  It  is  not  a  subject  of  international  obligation,  or  of 
claims  of  right  by  foreign  powers,  and  the  principles  of  law  or  equity 
cannot  be  so  applied  to  it  as  to  make  it  justiciable  under  these 
treaties. 

There  are  men  of  enlightened  judgment  who  think  that  even  such 
subjects  as  these  should  be  and  eventually  may  be  brought  within 
the  scope  of  international  arbitration.  The  President  himself  has 
openly  avowed  this  opinion.  The  system  will  never  be  complete 
until  it  has  become  as  impossible  for  a  strong  nation  to  stand  upon 
its  power,  regardless  of  right,  as  for  a  strong  man  to  bully  and  over¬ 
reach  his  weaker  neighbor.  It  is  enough  at  present  to  say  that  the 
treaties  exclude  such  subjects.  Claims  of  right,  resting  in  recog¬ 
nized  international  obligation  and  capable  of  decision  by  the  prin¬ 
ciples  of  law  or  equity,  cannot  arise  out  of  them. 

Something  more  may  be  said  about  territory.  On  this  subject 
the  majority  sound  an  alarm  to  the  states,  declaring  that  the  very 
soil  under  their  feet  may  be  involved.  “The  rights  of  each  state 
and  of  the  United  States  to  their  territory,”  it  is  said,  “might  be 
forced  to  arbitration.”  Do  these  gentlemen  really  believe,  or  do 
they  expect  anybody  else  to  believe,  that  any  foreign  power  can  or 
ever  will  claim,  as  of  right,  the  territory  of  any  state,  or,  if  claimed, 
that  any  foreign  power  could  prove  title  to  it  upon  principles  of  law 
or  equity?  Such  an  appeal  to  the  galleries  would  seem  out  of  place 
here.  Questions  of  territory  are  familiar  subjects  of  arbitration. 
Every  question  of  boundary  is  a  question  of  territory.  We  began 
to  arbitrate  such  questions  almost  as  long  ago  as  the  Jay  Treaty 
of  1795.  In  the  forties  we  surrendered  to  Great  Britain  a  consid¬ 
erable  territory  claimed  by  Maine  and  Massachusetts,  and  the  settle¬ 
ment  was  received  with  general  approval  even  in  the  states  directly 
concerned.  A  few  years  later  the  country  rang  with  the  Oregon 
boundary  cry  of  “fifty-four  forty  or  fight,”  but  there  was  no  fifty- 
four  forty,  and  there  was  no  fight.  We  peaceably  and  sensibly 
accepted  much  less  than  we  claimed.  Great  Britain,  perhaps  the 
most  confident  and  aggressive  of  all  the  powers,  has  repeatedly 
done  the  same  thing.  It  is  little  better  than  nonsense  to  say 
that  arbitration  of  a  claim  of  right  to  disputed  territory,  capable 
of  decision  by  the  principles  of  law  or  equity,  involves  “aban¬ 
donment  of  our  sovereignty  and  independence.”  Have  we  any 
territory  to  which  any  such  claim  can  be  asserted?  If  so,  where  is 
it?  We  have  the  territory  of  the  Filipinos,  which,  as  many  think, 
belongs  to  them,  but  we  are  not  now  making  a  treaty  with  the  Fili- 


I5 


pinos,  nor  can  they  come  into  the  treaty-making  family  without 
our  consent.  Is  it  the  Panama  Canal  zone?  It  is  possible  that 
our  title  to  that  could  be  impeached,  and,  if  so,  the  sooner  the  better, 
that  it  may  be  made  good.  What  would  be  thought  of  a  man  in 
possession  of  land  claimed  as  of  right  by  his  neighbor,  who  defies 
the  law  and  insists  on  keeping  possession  by  force,  if  he  can?  Do  we 
desire  to  take  that  lawless  attitude  toward  the  nations,  or  do  we 
need  to?  Are  there  any  such  claims,  anywhere,  and  is  it  desired, 
taking  advantage  of  our  strength,  to  suppress  them  by  menace  of 
superior  force,  and  is  this  the  reason  why  we  will  not  agree  in  advance 
to  arbitrate  them? 

It  would  seem,  if  the  majority  really  feel  the  apprehensions  they 
express  that  the  treaties  may  let  in  upon  us  any  claims  of  the  non- 
jus  ticiable  classes,  that  they  would  have  accepted  the  suggestion  of 
the  dissenting  senators  to  exclude  them,  once  for  all,  by  reserva¬ 
tion  in  ratifying  the  treaty,  without  mutilating  the  text.  They  can 
hardly  complain  if  the  turning  of  their  backs  upon  this  simple, 
inoffensive,  and  effective  method  of  quieting  these  fears,  and  insist¬ 
ing,  instead,  on  cutting  out  the  heart  of  the  treaties,  is  taken  as 
evidence  of  a  purpose  to  destroy  rather  than  to  perfect  them. 

The  majority  assert  that  the  Joint  High  Commission,  which  is  to 
decide  whether  a  case  is  within  the  scope  of  the  treaty,  may  be  com¬ 
posed  of  but  one  person,  or  may  be  composed  wholly  of  foreigners. 
This  is  contrary  to  the  universal  understanding  outside  of  the  com¬ 
mittee,  and  is  incorrect;  and,  while  it  may  not  be  worth  extended 
discussion,  it  is  addressed  to  the  Senate  for  the  purpose  of  influencing 
its  action  and  is  calculated  to  prejudice  the  treaties,  as  the  whole  con¬ 
troversy  arises  over  the  functions  of  this  Commission.  Article  II 
establishing  the  Joint  High  Commission  of  Inquiry  provides  that: — 

“whenever  a  question  or  matter  of  difference  is  referred  to  the  Joint 
High  Commission  of  Inquiry,  each  of  the  High  Contracting  Parties 
shall  designate  three  of  its  nationals  to  act  as  members  of  the  Com¬ 
mission  of  Inquiry  for  the  purposes  of  such  reference;  or  the  Commis¬ 
sion  may  be  otherwise  constituted  in  any  particular  case  by  the  terms 
of  the  reference.” 

The  only  ground  for  the  majority  statement  is  in  the  last  clause 
of  this  paragraph.  Passing  the  imputation  upon  any  occupant  of 
the  presidential  office  that,  even  if  it  be  as  they  say,  he  would  go  out 
of  his  way  and  out  of  the  ordinary  course  of  the  treaty  to  agree  to  a 
Commission  so  “otherwise  constituted”  as  to  imperil  any  national 
interest,  the  statement  cannot  be  reconciled  either  with  the  language 
or  the  purpose  of  the  treaty. 


i6 


The  final  clause  of  Article  III  prescribes  that: — 

“in  cases  in  which  the  Parties  disagree  as  to  whether  or  not  a  differ¬ 
ence  is  subject  to  arbitration  under  Article  I  of  this  Treaty,  that 
question  shall  be  submitted  to  the  Joint  High  Commission  of  In¬ 
quiry;  and  if  all  or  all  but  one  of  the  members  of  the  Commission  agree 
and  report  that  such  difference  is  within  the  scope  of  Article  I,  it 
shall  be  referred  to  arbitration  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of 
this  Treaty.” 

These  words,  “all  or  all  but  one  of  the  members  of  the  Commis¬ 
sion,”  cannot  be  applied  to  a  Commission  of  one  or  even  of  two 
persons.  The  word  “all,”  used  by  distinction  from  the  word  “one,” 
necessarily  implies  more  than  one.  And  the  Commission  is  the 
“Joint  High  Commission.”  A  Commission  of  one  is  not  a  “Joint” 
Commission. 

Not  only  is  the  “otherwise  constituted”  clause  of  Article  II  inca¬ 
pable  of  application  to  the  special  case  dealt  with  in  Article  III, 
but  there  can  be  no  intention  so  to  apply  it.  The  case  under  Article 
III  is  a  case  by  itself.  It  is  a  familiar  rule  that  special  provisions 
supersede  general  provisions,  if  there  is  inconsistency  between  them. 
The  purpose  is  clear  that  this  particular  question  shall  go  to  the  Joint 
High  Commission  constituted  by  the  treaty,  the  only  Commission 
constituted  by  the  treaty,  and  that  a  difference  shall  not  be  de¬ 
clared  arbitrable  unless  at  least  two  representatives  of  the  objecting 
power  concur  with  the  three  of  the  other  power  in  the  decision.  This 
is  the  only  construction  that  can  ensure  the  automatic  and  inde¬ 
feasible  operation  of  this  most  important  clause.  The  treaty  binds 
each  party  to  appoint  members  of  this  Joint  Commission  of  six  when¬ 
ever  either  party  calls  for  it.  It  does  not  bind  either  party  to  agree, 
under  any  circumstances,  to  any  Commission  otherwise  constituted. 

The  majority  report  invites  some  general  criticism  which  other¬ 
wise  might  well  be  spared.  The  argument  is  essentially  a  demonstra¬ 
tion  against  any  abridgment  of  the  senatorial  privileges.  It  is  not 
the  Constitution,  or  the  national  safety,  but  the  curule  dignity  that 
is  threatened.  Equally  apparent  is  an  underlying  jealousy  of  the 
President  or  the  presidential  office.  Secretary  Knox,  at  Cincinnati, 
broadly  intimated  that  this  senatorial  attitude  toward  the  Executive 
compelled  the  limiting  of  the  treaties  to  justiciable  claims  of  right 
instead  of  extending  the  benefits  of  arbitration  to  all  international 
disputes.  We  should  hardly  expect  to  find  an  official  document  of 
this  importance  appearing  under  examination  to  be  questionable 


i7 


in  motive,  mistaken  in  law,  inaccurate  in  statement,  unwarranted 
in  assumption,  sophistical  in  reasoning,  and  openly  hypocritical  in 
its  protests  of  friendship  for  arbitration  while  it  stabs  the  treaties  in 
the  back,  as  Joab  stabbed  his  brother  Amasa  in  the  act  of  embracing 
him.  No  one  would  lightly  ascribe  to  these  distinguished  gentlemen 
a  purpose  to  deceive  the  Senate,  or  the  people;  but  if  they  believe 
what  they  say,  they  have  deceived  themselves,  and  the  blunder  of  a 
statesman  may  be  as  bad  as  a  crime.  There  is  in  the  report  a  per¬ 
vading  tone  of  uncandor,  a  sense  of  something  covert  and  undis¬ 
closed,  of  a  purpose  to  eviscerate  the  treaties  for  a  reason  or  reasons 
which  are  not  uncovered  unless  senatorial  prerogative  is  the  only 
reason.  It  is  a  significant  feature  of  the  document  that,  while  the 
United  States  has  led  the  movement  for  arbitration,  as  its  foremost 
advocate  among  the  great  nations,  the  majority  of  this  committee 
is  contending  for  an  unbridled  privilege  to  prevent  arbitration,  and 
not  merely  this,  but  to  prevent  it  against  the  judgment  of  the  Ex¬ 
ecutive,  the  first  branch  of  the  treaty-making  power,  in  cases  to 
which  he  would  apply  it.  The  whole  drift  of  the  argument  is  to 
restrict  arbitration,  and  turn  the  face  of  the  United  States  against 
it,  on  the  evident  assumption  that  the  less  we  have  of  it,  the  better, — 
an  argument  which  the  people  will  hardly  accept,  whatever  the  atti¬ 
tude  of  the  Senate  may  be.  It  does  not  seem  to  be  thought  of,  that 
some  time  we  may  be  in  a  situation  to  invoke  arbitration  on  our 
own  account.  There  is  a  plain  implication,  if  the  words  mean  any¬ 
thing,  that  the  United  States  is  somehow  or  somewhere  liable  to 
claims  of  right  by  a  foreign  power  or  powers  which  we  cannot  afford 
to  submit  to  impartial  arbitration,  so  long  as  they  can  be  kept  in 
suppression  by  other  means.  Partisan  politics  are  supposed  to  be 
foreign  and  unknown  to  diplomacy  or  international  relations,  but 
there  is  even  a  lurking  sense  of  the  all-pervading  tariff  question. 
Is  it  possible  that  the  majority  see  the  ghost  of  protection  stalk¬ 
ing  behind  the  treaties?  Is  the  open  distrust  of  the  President’s 
power  in  making  an  agreement,  or  a  Commission,  occasioned  by  fear 
that  some  day  a  president  may  not  be  “sound”  upon  this  or  other 
political  issues? 

It  is  not  an  opportune  time  for  the  Senate  to  take  its  stand  upon 
prerogative  to  block  a  movement  at  which  the  world  is  looking  on. 
It  cannot  but  add  fuel  to  the  flame  of  its  consuming  unpopularity, 
and  put  a  new  and  formidable  weapon  in  the  hands  of  those  who 
would  reduce  the  Senate  of  the  Constitution  to  a  little  House  of  Rep¬ 
resentatives.  The  most  ancient,  illustrious,  and  powerful  Senate  in 


i8 


the  world  died  of  prerogative  two  or  three  months  ago.  If  our  Con¬ 
script  Fathers  consult  the  auspices,  they  will  deal  promptly  with  the 
wrong-headed  obstinacy,  the  cynical  indifference  to  the  moral  senti¬ 
ment  of  the  country,  that  characterizes  this  report.  As  for  the  people, 
there  are  one  or  two  things  for  them  to  do.  They  are  already  put  in 
a  false  position  before  the  world,  but  they  can  take  care  of  this,  and 
the  response  to  the  President’s  appeal  indicates  that  they  will  take 
care  of  it.  Among  our  ninety-odd  millions,  but  one  voice  accus¬ 
tomed  to  speak  with  authority  is  heard  in  dissent,  and  upon  this  ques¬ 
tion  the  people  will  hardly  go  for  counsel  to  a  temperamental  fighting 
man.  They  may  conclude  that  it  is  now  time  to  let  in  the  light  once 
for  all  upon  the  oracular  mysteries  of  “executive  session.”  If  this 
performance  had  taken  place  behind  closed  doors,  and  if  the  people 
had  not  found  out  in  time  the  character  of  the  arguments  by  which  it 
is  sought  to  control  the  Senate  in  an  act  of  supreme  consequence, 
the  cause  of  the  world’s  peace  might  have  been  set  back  for  a  genera¬ 
tion  and  the  interests  of  humanity  been  sacrificed  to  the  personal 
importance  of  half  a  dozen  men.  One-third  plus  one  of  the  senators 
present  in  secret  session,  playing  the  game  of  political  power  if  noth¬ 
ing  worse,  can  defeat  any  treaty.  It  is  ultimately  for  the  people  to 
say  whether  the  greatest  cause  that  now  appeals  to  the  enlightened 
sentiment  of  the  world  shall  be  struck  down  in  the  house  of  its  friends, 
that  a  jingo  Senate  may  some  day  be  in  a  position  to  juggle  with  the 
issues  of  war.  This  is  a  crisis  in  the  cause  of  international  arbitra¬ 
tion.  No  one  expects  that  these  treaties  will  bring  in  the  millennium, 
but,  when  three  of  the  foremost  nations  have  once  actually  sealed  a 
compact  to  arbitrate  all  justiciable  disputes,  which  the  ratification 
of  the  treaties  will  accomplish  and  the  amendment  sought  by  the 
majority  of  the  committee  will  prevent  and  defeat,  the  final  and  com¬ 
plete  success  of  the  movement  is  assured.  The  moral  attraction  of  a 
scheme  that  offers  even  a  prospect  of  immunity  from  war  will  draw  the 
other  nations  into  it  with  compelling  force.  The  United  States  is 
to-day,  where  it  has  always  been  and  where  it  belongs,  at  the  head 
of  the  movement.  To  strike  at  these  treaties  in  their  vital  part  will 
be  notice  to  the  world  that  the  American  nation  has  faced  about  and 
stands  in  the  way  of  any  further  advance  toward  a  real  league  of 
peace.  Unless  the  people  are  content  to  be  put  in  that  attitude,  it 
i s  for  them  to  see  that  the  treaties  come  to  no  harm. 


If  a  thousandth  part  of  what  has  been  expended  in  war  and  pre¬ 
paring  its  mighty  engines  had  been  devoted  to  the  development  of 
reason  and  the  diffusion  of  Christian  principles ,  nothing  would  have 
been  known  for  centuries  past  of  its  terrors ,  its  sufferings ,  its  im¬ 
poverishment,  and  its  demoralization,  but  what  was  learned  from 
history. — Horace  mann. 

Were  half  the  power  that  fills  the  world  with  terror, 

Were  half  the  wealth  bestowed  on  camps  and  courts, 
Given  to  redeem  the  human  mind  from  error, 

There  were  no  need  of  arsenals  or  forts. — longfellow. 


SYNDICATES  FOR  WAR. 

The  intolerable  burdens  of  taxation  imposed  by  the  present 
monstrous  armaments  of  the  nations  are  being  everywhere  real¬ 
ized,  and  the  naval  budgets  are  being  criticised  as  never  before. 
The  people  are  being  shown  how  much  of  the  increased  cost  of 
living  is  due  to  these  frightful  extravagances  and  wastes,  which 
make  the  existing  armed  peace  hardly  less  serious  than  war 
itself.  They  have  not  been  adequately  shown  how  much  of 
this  expenditure  is  due  to  the  systematic  and  persistent  activity 
of  great  interests  which  are  selfishly  profiting  by  it.  The  World 
Peace  Foundation  in  Boston  has  just  published,  under  the  title 
of  “  Syndicates  for  War/’  a  special  pamphlet  devoted  to  the  ex¬ 
posure  of  this  ruthless  despoiling  of  the  public  treasury  for  pri¬ 
vate  and  corporate  gain.  It  is  a  reprint  of  some  startling  Lon¬ 
don  letters  to  the  New  York  Evening  Post,  revealing  a  mass  of 
confessed  and  indisputable  facts  of  the  situation  in  England 
almost  incredible  in  their  grossness.  The  situation  is  undoubtedly 
almost  as  bad  in  Germany,  France,  and  the  United  States;  and 
we  know  that  it  is  much  worse  in  Russia.  It  is  to  be  hoped  that 
this  pamphlet  may  be  followed  by  another  dealing  with  similar 
evils  nearer  home.  But  the  present  pamphlet  should  prompt 
our  people  to  some  solemn  thinking  as  to  the  part  taken  by  cer¬ 
tain  vested  interests  in  keeping  up  the  periodical  war-scares  that 
ensure  them  regular  business  and  immense  gains  at  the  public 
cost.  The  pamphlet  is  an  amazing  revelation  of  the  hidden 
springs  of  political  measures  which  saddle  inordinate  taxes  upon 
the  people. 


INTERNATIONAL  LIBRARY 

Edited  by  EDWIN  D.  MEAD 

PUBLISHED  BY  THE  WORLD  PEACE  FOUNDATION 


Hale  —  Mohonk  Addresses.  Mailing  price,  $x.oo 
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Hull  —  The  Two  Hague  Conferences.  Mailing  price,  $1.65 
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The  World  Peace  Foundation  has  also  the  following 
works  in  pamphlet  form 

BETHINK  YOURSELVES!  —  By  Leo  Tolstoi.  Postpaid,  10  cents 
A  LEAGUE  OF  PEACE  :  Rectorial  Address  before  the  University 
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10  cents 

PATRIOTISM  AND  THE  NEW  INTERNATIONALISM.  A 
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